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Antitrust: Shared Information Between the FTC 
and the Department of Justice 
Judy Beckner Sloan* 
An increasing number of corporate activities are subjected to 
federal regulation, regulation that is often accomplished by re- 
quiring corporate disclosures of information. By disclosing such 
information, a corporation and its officials may subject them- 
selves to future civil or criminal liability. Moreover, because 
agencies such as the Internal Ftevenue Service, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
and the Justice Department have been given both civil and crimi- 
nal enforcement responsibilities, the possibility exists that infor- 
mation obtained by an agency pursuant to a civil proceeding may 
be used by the agency in a later criminal investigation or proceed- 
ing.' The same possibility of shared information exists where two 
agencies are charged with enforcement in the same area, such as 
the Justice Department and the FTC's joint responsibility for 
antitrust enforcement .2 
The possible use of information obtained through regulatory 
activities or civil discovery by one agency in a later criminal 
proceeding by the same or a different agency raises substantial 
constitutional questions, including issues of due process and self- 
in~rimination.~ These constitutional rights provide two of the pos- 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. B.A., 1967, Univer- 
sity of Chicago; J.D., 1975, University of Maryland. 
1. See, e.g., FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 567 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
2. The issue of information sharing has arisen most often in the context of IRS 
investigations that result in information being shared with the Justice Department in 
order to bring criminal actions. See, e.g., United States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248 
(D. Mass. 1953). This practice may also be occurring between other agencies, including 
the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission. See FTC Investigational File 
No. 721-0091 (1978). The issue has also arisen where private plaintiffs wish to share, or 
the government wishes to obtain, information the plaintiffs have obtained in a private civil 
action. See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1976-1 Trade Cas. 68,840 (S.D.N .Y. 
1976). The Justice Department's statutory authority for antitrust investigation is provided 
by 4 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 4 4 (1976). The FTC's authority is based on P 5 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. # 45 (1976). 
3. The constitutional issues arise because of the fundamental differences between 
civil and criminal proceedings. As stated by the court in Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 
478,487 (5th Cir. 1962): "There is a clear-cut distinction between private interests in civil 
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sible defenses a corporation may assert when it finds itself within 
the sights of a governmental double-barreled prosecution. 
How can a corporation prevent information it has been forced 
to disclose from being used against it or corporate officials in a 
simultaneous or subsequent criminal or civil proceeding? The 
corporation must a t  least (1) establish that information is being 
or will be shared,' (2) appropriately time the objection to the 
sharing,' (3) select the best forum in which to complain about the 
 har ring,^ and (4) select the best remedy to prevent the sharing.' 
The FTC and the Antitrust Division of the Justice Depart- 
ment, each possessing power to enforce the antitrust laws, pro- 
vide good subjects for consideration of the possible hazards con- 
fronting a corporation and its officials exposed to simultaneous 
investigations. This Article will consider defenses a corporation 
or its officers might raise and remedies they might seek if they 
are involved, actually or potentially, in simultaneous proceed- 
litigation and the public interest in a criminal prosecution, between a civil trial and a 
criminal trial, and between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure." 
4. Courts do not appear as concerned about whether information is actually shared 
as they are about whether there is any potential for problems of self-incrimination or fair 
use in the criminal proceeding when both civil and criminal prosecutions are occurring 
simultaneously. See Gordon v. FDIC, 427 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1970); SEC v. Vesco, [1972- 
1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 7 93,777 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Dienstag v. 
Bronsen, 49 F.R.D. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
5. One court, in SEC v. Vesco, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 
7 93,777 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), was willing to grant relief when a criminal proceeding was only 
contemplated. Relief usually has been granted, however, only where both the civil and 
criminal prosecutions are underway. See Perry v. McGuire, 36 F.R.D. 272 (S.D.N.Y. 
1964); Paul Harrigan & Sons v. Enterprise Animal Oil Co., 14 F.R.D. 333 (E.D. Pa. 1953); 
National Discount Corp. v. Holzbaugh, 13 F.R.D. 236 (E.D. Mich. 1952). 
6. In the case of contemporaneous criminal and civil proceedings, most courts hold 
that the judge in the civil proceedings can stay or limit discovery in the civil trial until 
the conclusion of the criminal proceeding. See United States v. Amrep Corp., 405 F. Supp. 
1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (stay of civil proceedings); Dienstag v. Bronsen, 49 F.R.D. 327 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (stay of discovery). The issue of what a judge can do in criminal proceed- 
ings, however, appears to be unresolved. See United States v. Simon, 262 F. Supp. 64 
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 373 F.2d 649 (2d Cir.), vacated per curium as moot sub nom. 
Simon v. Wharton, 389 U.S. 425 (1967). For a general discussion of this area, see Com- 
ment, Concurrent Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1967); Note, 
Stay of Discovery in Civil Court to Protect Proceedings in Concurrent Criminal Ac- 
tion-The Pattern of Remedies, 66 MICH. L. REV. 738 (1968). 
7. Remedies requested may include a stay of discovery in the civil trial, Perry v. 
McGuire, 36 F.R.D. 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), suspension of the civil proceedings until after 
termination of the criminal proceedings, United States v. Amrep Corp., 405 F. Supp. 1053 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), a protective order, SEC v. Vesco, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. 
L. REP. (CCH) 7 93,777 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), or an attempt to assure that information fur- 
nished to the investigatory staff of an administrative agency not be used by its adjudica- 
tory staff, e.g., FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 567 F.2d 96, 106-07 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
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ings. The focus of this Article will be on the FTC and the Justice 
Department, as well as the various methods these agencies use in 
antitrust enforcement; however, since other federal agencies have 
dual enforcement powers or concurrent jurisdiction over addi- 
tional business areas, the issues considered here also have appli- 
cation elsewhere in administrative law. 
11. ANTITRUST- JOINT RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FTC 
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
Congress has given both the FTC and the Antitrust Division 
of the Justice Department responsibility for antitrust regulation. 
The FTC is empowered by section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Com- 
mission Act to prevent individuals, partnerships, and corpora- 
tions from engaging in unfair methods of c~mpetit ion.~ The FTC 
carries out enforcement actions by adjudicatory proceedings gov- 
erned by its own rules of procedure;@ if the FTC finds unfair 
competition, it can issue a cease-and-desist order.1° 
The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department has been 
given powers to bring both criminal and civil actions. The actions 
are brought in federal district court and are governed by the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Section 2 of the Sherman Act expressly provides for 
criminal penalties for those found guilty of monopolizing trade. l1 
Courts have implicitly found authorization for the Justice De- 
partment to bring civil actions under the Sherman Act when it 
is not possible to prove criminal intent.12 The Justice Department 
8. 15 U.S.C. 4 45(a)(l) (1976). 
9. The FTC's rules in adjudicatory proceedings have recently been changed. For t h i  
most recent version, see 43 Fed. Reg. 56,862 (1978) (codified at 16 C.F.R. $8  3.1-.72). One 
result of these changes is to give much greater control to the administrative law judge. 
For a discussion of the changes, see [I9781 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 882, 
a t  A-15 (Sept. 28, 1978). 
10. The FTC retains the power to modify the order if it chooses. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) 
(1976). The order in its final form is reviewable by the appropriate federal court of appeals, 
and it  has priority over other cases. Id. 45(c). 
11. 15 U.S.C. 4 2 (1976). Prior to 1974 such behavior was a misdemeanor punishable 
by a fine of $50,000, a prison sentence, or both. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 2, 26 Stat. 209 
(1890), as amended by Act of Jul. 7, 1955, ch. 281, 69 Stat. 282 (revised 1974). In 1974, 
however, the punishment was changed by Congress to a felony with a fine of $1,000,000 
for a corporation, $100,000 for an individual, a prison sentence of three years, or both a t  
the court's discretion. Antitrust Procedure and Penalties Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 
§ 3, 88 Stat. 1708 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 2). 
12. The element of criminal intent in antitrust actions was most recently discussed 
by the Supreme Court in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978). 
The Court indicated that since a violation of the Sherman Act is now a felony, a corporate 
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relies on civil actions more often than criminal actions; criminal 
penalties have been fairly light. l3 
The antitrust jurisdiction of the FTC and the Justice Depart- 
ment overlaps in many areas. In fact, the Federal Trade Commis- 
sion Act can be seen as a supplement to the Sherman Act. Tradi- 
tionally, by a liaison arrangement, the two departments have 
coordinated their investigations.14 This arrangement began in 
1938 and was formalized in 1948.15 Under the arrangement, before 
an investigation is begun the investigating agency informs the 
other agency concerning the investigation and reveals the party 
to be investigated, the charges, the product involved, and the fact 
that an investigation is contemplated.l"f the matter is pending 
in the other agency, there will be further liaison activities; other- 
wise, the investigation commences.17 Because of this arrange- 
ment, patterns in the types of industries that each agency investi- 
gates have developed. l8 
Recent litigation, however, indicates that the two agencies 
may no longer be making independent investigations, but instead 
defendant cannot be held to a standard of strict liability. Actual criminal intent must be 
shown. Id. at6442-43 & n.18. 
13. See Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 
389-95 (1970). The policy toward few criminal prosecutions and light penalties, however, 
may be changing. There are indications that the Justice Department is increasing its 
criminal prosecutions under the amended Act. See, e.g., O'Leary, Criminal Antitrust and 
the Corporate Executive: The Man in the Middle, 63 A.B.A.J. 1389, 1390 (1977); [I9781 
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) NO. 359, a t  6 (Nov. 13,1978). The Justice Department has issued 
guidelines recommending that there be an 18-month base prison sentence for conviction 
of a Sherman Act violation, with the use of fines only if the court refuses to impose the 
recommended prison sentence. See Justice Department Guidelines for Sentencing Rec- 
ommendations in Felony Cases Under the Sherman Act, reprinted in [I9771 ANTITRUST 
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 803, a t  F-1 to -3 (Mar. 1,1977). The Department of Justice 
is also recommending minimum corporate fines of $100,000. Id. at  F-5 to -6. 
14. Roll, Dual Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws by the Department of Justice and 
the FTC: The Liaison Procedure, 31 Bus. LAW. 2075, 2075-76 (1976). 
15. Id. a t  2077. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at  2077-78. 
18. Areas traditionally investigated by the Justice Department Antitrust Division 
include the following: banking and securities; aviation; newspaper acquisitions; alumi- 
num; tire manufacturing; computers; international agreements; communications; brew- 
ing acquisitions; automobile industry monopolization and dealer relations; steel (primary) 
patents and knowhow (with some major exceptions). Id. at  2080. 
The FTC has traditionally investigated the following areas: brewing monopolization 
and price discrimination; autoparts monopolization and acquisitions; tires, batteries, and 
accessories distribution; cement; shopping center trade restraints; department store ac- 
quisitions; health care; food and food distribution; petroleum monopolization; copiers and 
business machines; franchising; textile mill products acquisitions; dairy industry acquisi- 
tions. Id. 
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are supplying information to each other on concurrent investiga- 
tions." The result of this practice is that information obtained by 
the FTC through its more liberal discovery methods may be sup- 
plied to the Justice Department for use in criminal  prosecution^.^^ 
The impact of this sharing of information should be of considera- 
ble concern to a corporation with potential antitrust problems, 
especially when the rapidly expanding power of the FTC to gather 
information about corporate activities through its investigatory, 
rulemaking, adjudicatory, and regulatory activities is considered. 
111. THE ROLE OF THE FTC' 
The FTC has broad investigatory powers. It is empowered 
" [t]o gather and compile information concerning, and to investi- 
gate from time to time . . . any person, partnership, or corpora- 
tion engaged in or whose business affects commerce, excepting 
banks and common  carrier^."^^ This provision has been inter- 
preted as permitting simultaneous investigatory and adjudica- 
tory proceedings by the FTCez2 
The FTC recently used its investigatory power to initiate a 
line-of-business and corporate-pattern reports program." The 
19. Letter from Joel R. Platt, Attorney, Chicago Regional Office of the FTC, to Earl 
E. Pollock (July 26, 1978) (attached as an exhibit in a motion to the FTC to stay discovery, 
FTC Investigational File No. 721-0091 (1978). 
[Tlhe FTC has made available to the United States Attorney all of the mate- 
rial contained in its files relating to this matter and will continue to do so in 
the future. In addition, the U.S. Attorney's office has authorized our office to 
indicate to you that they will seek to obtain any new information which the FTC 
receives. 
If you wish to object to the FTC sharing newly submitted information with the 
Justice Department or any other agency, you may make a request for confiden- 
tiality under 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4) which is incorporated into the FTC Rules a t  
4.lO(a)(2). 
Id. 
20. See Roll, supra note 14, a t  2078. 
21. 15 U.S.C. 4 46(a) (1976). 
22. See, e.g., Genuine Parts Co. v. FTC, 445 F.2d 1382 (5th Cir. 1971); Atlantic 
Richfield Co. v. FTC, 398 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v. 
W C ,  291 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Va. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 416 F.2d 971 (4th Cir. 1969). 
23. As described in [I9731 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 626, a t  A-17 
(Aug. 14, 1973): 
[Tlhe FTC's line-of-business proposal would require most corporations with 
assets of $50 million or more to report their profits, revenue, advertising expend- 
itures, and R&D costs for any of about 400 product categories ranging from the 
manufacturing of food products, to industrial trucks and tractors, and to com- 
puters. As of now, the number of firms covered by the reporting requirements 
would be close to 2,000. 
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FTC has indicated that one purpose of these reports is to select 
possible targets for antitrust enforcement? However, the value of 
the information that the FTC will obtain by these reports is dis- 
p ~ t e d . ~ ~  After the program was implemented in 1974, numerous 
corporations responded by initiating court challenges to the new 
program. These challenges have been largely unsuccessful. The 
Supreme Court recently refused to grant certiorari to consider 
whether the FTC has authority to require such reports.z6 With the 
failure of these court challenges, it  is likely that the FTC will be 
able to force compliance with its reporting program.27 The ques- 
tion as to the confidentiality of the data that the corporations 
furnish remains unanswered. 
The FTC also has rulemaking power. The basis of this power 
was provided by amendments 7(b) and (c) to the procedures and 
rules of practice of the FTC in 1962." As a result of these amend- 
ments, the F'TC began promulgating trade regulation rules that 
were to be used as standards for obtaining cease-and-desist or- 
ders. 
Since these rules lacked an explicit statutory basis, there was 
a question concerning their validity. The test of the FTC's power 
to promulgate these rules came in National Petroleum Refiners 
Association v. FTC? The D.C. Circuit held that section 6(g) of 
the Federal Trade Commission ActJ0 empowered the FTC to pro- 
mulgate such rules and that the rules have the force of substan- 
tive law. In FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson CO.~' the Supreme Court 
- 
24. Id. at A-16. 
25. For a discussion of the lack of value of the information, see Benston, The Baffling 
New Numbers Game at the FTC, FORTUNE, Oct. 1975, at 174; Bock, Line-of-Business 
Reporting: A Quest for a Snark, CONF. BOARD REC., Nov. 1975, at 10. 
26. See, e.g., American Air Filter Co. v. FTC, 439 U.S. 958 (1979) (denying cert. to 
Appeal of FTC Line of Business Report Litigation, 595 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). The 
appellate court rejected the corporation's arguments that the FTC lacked power to require 
the reporting procedures, that the program violated the confidentiality provisions of the 
Census Act, that rulemaking procedures should have been initiated before establishing the 
program, and that the FTC had exceeded its investigatory powers. The court also indi- 
cated that the issue of the use of the line-of-business and corporate-pattern data by the 
FTC in other administrative proceedings should be raised in those proceedings. For other 
earlier decisions reaching similar conclusions, see A.O. Smith Corp. v. FTC, 396 F. Supp. 
1108 (D. Del. 1975), revised, 530 F.2d 515 (3d Cir. 1976). 
27. See [I9781 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 888, at A-1 (Nov. 9, 1978). 
28. See 27 Ted. Reg. 4636, 4796-97 (1962). For a discussion of the various Federal 
Trade Commissioners' viewpoints at the time of the amendments, see Burrus & Teter, 
Antitrust: Rulemaking v. Adjudication in the FTC, 54 GEO. L.J. 1106 (1966). 
29. 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
30. 15 U.S.C. 5 46(g) (1976). 
31. 405 U.S. 233 (1972). 
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indicated that through its rulemaking power the FTC, in addition 
to regulating deceptive acts and practices, could regulate unfair 
business practices. 
Explicit statutory authorization of rulemaking power was 
given to the FTC by the Magnuson-Moss amendments to the 
Federal Trade Commission Act in 1975.32 Prior to instituting a 
rule, the FTC must generally follow formal rulemaking proce- 
dures. These include publication of notice of the proposed rule in 
the Federal Register, allowance of submission of written materi- 
als by interested parties, opportunity for interested parties to 
present materials at an informal hearing, preparation of a tran- 
script of any such presentation, and promulgation of a rule based 
on the evidence in the record.33 After a rule is issued, it may be 
challenged in the appropriate United States court of appeals. If 
the rule is not supported by substantial evidence in the rulemak- 
ing record, it can be overturned. Because of the relatively recent 
enactment of this amendment, the areas in which the FTC will 
choose to exercise its rulemaking power are not yet defined. The 
FTC could use the authority, in a method similar to the line-of- 
business reports procedure, to promulgate rules requiring disclo- 
sure of facts that could later be used in antitrust enforcement 
actions. 
Another means for the FTC to obtain information that might 
later be used in antitrust enforcement actions is through premer- 
ger notification requirements. Premerger notification require- 
ments were part of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improve- 
- 
32. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. 
L. No. 93-637, § 202(a), 88 Stat. 2193 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 5 57(a)). For a discus- 
sion of the rulemaking authority of the FTC and the effect of this amendment, see Kinter 
& Smith, The Emergence of the Federal Trade Commission as a Formidable Consumer 
Protection Agency, 26 MERCER L. REV. 651 (1975); Nelson, The Politicization of FTC 
Rulemaking, 8 CONN. L. REV. 413 (1976); Rosch, Rulemaking Under the Federal Trade 
Commission Improvement Act, 44 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 515 (1975); Tyler & Erickson, 
The Federal Trade Commission Today: The New Improved Improvements Act, 3 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 849 (1976). 
33. These requirements should be considered in light of the Supreme Court's decision 
in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 
U.S. 519 (1978). In Vermont Yankee the Court indicated that judicial review of agency 
rulemaking is limited to assuring that the agency rulemaking meet the minimal statutory 
requirements. For a thorough discussion of Vermont Yankee, see Breyer, Vermont Yankee 
and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (1978); 
Byse, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure: A Somewhat 
Different View, 91 HAW. L. REV. 1823 (1978); Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution 
of Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1805 (1978). 
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ment Act of 1976.34 The rationale for enactment of the require- 
ments was to prevent future antitrust violations by controlling 
present corporate mergers." The premerger notification provi- 
sions require the Justice Department and the FTC to be notified 
before mergers of certain size corporations take place.36 The FTC, 
through its rulemaking power, is authorized to determine the 
form of the required report.37 Once the report is filed, the merger 
can take place in thirty days-unless it is challenged in federal 
court by the Department of Justice or the FTC.38 The FTC can 
extend the thirty-day period for up to twenty additional days if 
it requests further information from the corporat i~n.~~ Civil pen- 
alties of up to $10,000 per day exist for companies and individuals 
who fail to comply with the premerger notification  provision^.^^ 
The form promulgated by the FTC requires, for example, 
information as to the dollar revenue of manufactured products, a 
description of voting securities, and submission of all documents 
that may have been prepared for the purpose of evaluating the 
acquisition in advance of the merger." The potential use of the 
information the FTC collects from this form may not appear 
great; however, the FTC indicated in its comments about the 
form that it does not view the information obtained from the form 
as confidential as to use within the agency." The FTC also indi- 
cated that its interpretation of the confidentiality section of the 
premerger notification provisions permits it or the Justice De- 
partment to use the information in any administrative or judicial 
proceedings in which the agencies are involved." The FTC has 
indicated that it would instruct its staff and the staff of the Jus- 
tice Department to give the companies notice whenever the infor- 
mation submitted on the premerger forms might become part of 
34. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 5 201, 90 Stat. 1390 (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. $ 18a). 
35. For a discussion of this act, see Kintner, Griffin, & Goldston, The Hart-Scott- 
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976: An Analysis, 46 GEO. WASH. L REV. 1 (1977); 
Scher, Emerging Issues Under the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 
679 (1977). 
36. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976). 
37. Id. § 18a(d). 
38. Id. § 18a(b). In the case of a cash tender offer, however, the time limit is 15 days. 
Id. $ 18a(b)(l)(B). 
39. Id. § 18a(e). In the case of a cash tender offer, however, the time period can be 
extended by only 10 days. Id. 
40. Id. § 18a(g)(l). 
41. For a copy of the form, see 43 Fed. Reg. 33,552 (1978). 
42. See id. a t  33,518-19 (1978). 
43. Id. at 33,519. 
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the public record.44 There has been no litigation to date concern- 
ing the use of this data by the FTC. 
The premerger notification requirements, the line-of- 
business/corporate-pattern reports, and the rulemaking power are 
all examples of the FTC's increasing ability to obtain a wide 
range of information concerning corporate activities that may 
later be used against corporations in antitrust enforcement ac- 
tions. The FTC also has its traditional means of acquiring infor- 
mation through investigations or adjudicatory proceedings. The 
possibility that information the FTC collects may be turned over 
to the Justice Department for use in criminal prosecutions is a 
frightening prospect for corporate executives. A successful crimi- 
nal prosecution can lead to corporate and individual fines and can 
stigmatize the individual defendant with a felony conviction, 
which can result in the loss of professional memberships. Another 
possible result of finding criminal liability is the susceptibility of 
the corporation to a parens patriae action, a civil action that can 
be brought by a state attorney general for violations of the Sher- 
man This course of action is another result of the Antitrust 
Improvement Act of 1976. 
An additional hazard for a corporation found guilty in crimi- 
nal or civil proceedings instituted by the FTC or the Antitrust 
Division is potential liability in a private antitrust action for 
treble damages and attorneys' fees." A final judgment against the 
defendant in a criminal or civil antitrust proceeding is prima facie 
evidence against the defendant in a later private antitrust ac- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  Even if there has not been a final judgment against the 
corporate defendant, the possibility exists that information the 
FTC has in its files may be used against a corporation in a private 
antitrust action. As the Supreme Court stated in a decision in- 
volving the FTC: 
The greater resources and expertise of the Commission and 
its staff render the private suitor a tremendous benefit aside 
from any value he may derive from a judgment or decree. In- 
deed, so useful is this service that government proceedings are 
recognized as a major source of evidence for private parties.48 
44. Id. 
45. 15 U.S.C.  § 15c (1976). 
46. Id. !j 15. 
47. Id. § 16(a). 
48. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 US. 311, 
319 (1965). 
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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Freedom of 
Information Act provide the mechanism for a plaintiff in a pri- 
vate antitrust action to obtain information the government holds 
concerning a corporate defendant.49 Limitations on discovery 
within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are that the informa- 
tion must be relevant, not privileged, and not the work product 
of an attorney.50 Statutory limits on information the federal gov- 
ernment will provide under the Freedom of Information Act in- 
clude trade secrets, customer lists, privileged or confidential in- 
formation, and interagency memos.51 There are few statutory lim- 
its on the release of information to a private antitrust plaintiff.52 
IV. THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
The Justice Department has a number of methods of acquir- 
ing information when investigating corporate antitrust violations. 
One method is the use of informal means.53 Justice Department 
employees read newspapers and journals and receive tips from 
disgruntled employees or  competitor^.^^ Another source of infor- 
mation is the voluntary letter request, backed up by two other 
means of obtaining information-civil investigatory demands 
(CID's) and the subpoena power.55 
The CID powers were recently increased for the Justice De- 
partment by the Antitrust Improvement Act. The Assistant At- 
torney General or the Attorney General can use the CID to re- 
quest documents or depositions or issue interrogatories to corpo- 
rations, partnerships, associations, or individuals prior to a civil 
or criminal proceeding." The conduct under investigation must 
involve antitrust violations or merger activities that may result 
in  violation^.^^ 
The information obtained may be used by the Department 
49. See 5 U.S.C. Q 552 (1976); FED. R. CN. P. 26. 
50. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(l), (3). 
51. 5 U.S.C. 8 552(b)(4), (5) (1976). 
52. In a recent case, the New York Attorney General attempted to use the Freedom 
of Information Act to obtain information that a corporate defendant had provided to the 
FTC to use against the corporation in a parens patriae action for violations of state 
antitrust law. I19791 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) NO. 377, at 5 (Mar. 20, 1979). 
53. See Reeves, How the Antitrust Division Can Use Its New Powers to Obtain 
Statistical Records and Testimony From Trade Associations and Trade Association 
Executives, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 355, 357 (1977). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. 15 U.S.C. Q 1312(a) (1976). 
57. Id. 8 1312(b)(l). 
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of Justice before a court or grand jury and may be given to the 
FTC upon written request.58 If an individual or corporation re- 
fuses to comply, the Justice Department can seek judicial en- 
forcement in federal district court, where all objections to the CID 
must be aired." If the individual or corporation still refuses to 
comply after a court order, the Department of Justice can seek 
criminal penalties, including a fine of up to $5,000, a prison term 
of up to five years, or both.'O Information cannot be obtained, 
however, that is protected from disclosure by either the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure or restrictions on the subpoena duces 
tecum." For instance, during depositions possible objections 
might include improper motive and first, fourth, and fifth 
amendment  privilege^.'^ 
The grand jury is another means by which the Justice De- 
partment can acquire information about the activities of a corpo- 
ration. The Justice Department may begin an investigation with 
a grand jury but later decide to use civil  proceeding^.'^ The use 
of the grand jury is governed by the Federal Rules of Criminal 
P r o c e d ~ r e . ~ ~  The Rules govern such aspects of grand jury proceed- 
ings as the means by which the jurors are summoned, objections 
to the grand jury or jurors, who may be present, the secrecy of the 
proceedings, and the findings included in the return of the indict- 
ment.65 
The corporate official subpoened to testify before a grand 
jury must be careful if he wishes to preserve his fifth amendment 
privilege. A witness before a federal grand jury does not have the 
right to have his attorney present while he is questioned,'' nor 
does he have the right to be informed that he is the target of the 
grand jury investigation." 
A crucial issue for a corporation or its officers under investi- 
gation or indictment by the Justice Department for a criminal 
58. Id. § 1313(d). 
59. Id. § 1314(d). 
60. 18 U.S.C. 0 1505 (1976). 
61. 15 U.S.C. 8 1312(c) (1976). 
62. Reeves, supra note 53, at 360. 
63. Id. at 358-59. 
64. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 6(d). 
67. Cf.  United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976) (a witness before a grand 
jury did not have to be given Miranda warnings before his testimony). 
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antitrust violation is how to prevent any information they may 
have previously or currently disclosed to the FTC from being used 
against them in a criminal proceeding. They can make several 
arguments. Each of these arguments involves two important is- 
sues. First, how can it be established that the FTC is in fact 
giving information it has gathered to the Justice Department for 
use in criminal proceedings? Assuming that the information shar- 
ing would be invalid if proved, the corporation or officers can 
argue that  since information sharing occurs solely within the 
province of the government, the burden of proving that informa- 
tion sharing has occured should not be on the private party. In- 
stead, it  should be up to the FTC and the Justice Department to 
demonstrate that information sharing has not occurred. The cor- 
poration or officers can also seek a suspension of any FTC investi- 
gation until after the criminal prosecution is concluded and a ban 
on any use of evidence gathered by the FTC from any criminal 
trial, unless it could have been obtained independently through 
criminal discovery or was part of the public record. 
The other important issue is timing. Should the objection to 
the shared information be made, for example, in FTC adjudica- 
tory proceedings in an effort to stop an administrative subpoena, 
in a private civil action, or in the criminal case itself? Another 
aspect of timing involves ripeness-can a corporation or its offi- 
cers object to information sharing before the FTC when no crimi- 
nal prosecution is currently pending?68 
If the corporation or officers can overcome the problems of 
timing and proof, the issue becomes what substantive law and 
arguments can be marshalled to attack the information sharing. 
There are several theories that can be advanced to support the 
substantive attack. 
A. FTC Procedural Rules 
The first theory that may be advanced to defeat information 
sharing was espoused in FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co.," which 
concerned the sharing of information between the FTC's investi- 
68. The appellate court in the line-of-business report cases indicated that concern 
over confidentiality of data was premature and should be raised in the specific proceeding 
where the violation was occurring. See, e.g.,  Appeal of FTC Line of Business Report 
Litigation, 595 F.2d 685, 707-08 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In another pertinent decision, In re 
Folding Carton Antitrust Ligitation, 465 I?. Supp. 618 (N.D. Ill. 1979), the district court 
held that claims of fifth amendment privilege were not applicable where there appeared 
to be little chance of any future criminal prosecution. 
69. 567 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
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gatory and adjudicatory staffs. Atlantic Richfield was simultane- 
ously involved in an adjudicatory proceeding concerning alleged 
antitrust violations and a congressionally authorized investiga- 
tion of the natural gas industry, both conducted by the FTC. 
Atlantic Richfield was seeking to ensure that the documents ob- 
tained by the FTC investigatory staff would not be used by the 
FTC staff in the adjudicatory proceeding without an opportunity 
for the administrative law judges or Atlantic Richfield to object. 
Two arguments were advanced by Atlantic Richfield. First, 
Atlantic Richfield argued that such a sharing of information was 
violative of the FTC's procedural rules that arguably did not 
permit access by the prosecutorial staff to documents obtained by 
investigatory subpoena. Second, Atlantic Richfield argued that 
such information sharing was violative of due process. 
Atlantic Richfield based its first argument, concerning the 
separation of adjudicatory and investigatory functions of the 
FTC, on the existence of separate rules of procedure for each 
activity. The existence of separate rules of discovery procedure for 
investigative and adjudicative proceedings conducted by the FTC 
indicated that information was not freely transferable between 
the two proceedings. The FTC responded by arguing that such 
information shariqg was permissible where, as in this case, the 
adjudicatory proceeding was launched in good faith. The D.C. 
Circuit agreed with Atlantic Richfield's argument. Such sharing 
of information, according to the court, would remove important 
powers of the administrative law judge to limit, quash, or approve 
subpoenas in adjudicatory  proceeding^.^^ The court concluded, 
however, that the FTC's position on the issue was unclear and 
remanded the case so the FTC could clarify its rule on the use of 
investigatory documents in adjudicative proceedings. 
Although the court used Atlantic Richfield's first argument 
as the basis for its decision, it indicated in dicta its opinion re- 
garding the due process issue. The court concluded that due pro- 
cess issuespwere inherently involved if such a sharing of informa- 
tion were permitted. The FTC has not yet clarified its position 
on this issue.71 
Thus a corporation or its officers could argue that if the FTC 
rules of procedure do not permit internal sharing of information, 
70. This argument may have been strengthened by the new FTC rules that seek to 
give the ad,ministrative law judge greater control over adjudicatory proceedings. See 
[I9781 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 882, at A-15 (Sept. 28, 1978). 
71. See id. at A-16. 
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then, a fortiori, the FTC should not be permitted to provide such 
information to the Justice Department for use in criminal pro- 
ceedings. The ultimate basis of such an argument is due process. 
B. Due Process 
The Supreme Court has recognized limits upon the informa- 
tion gathering powers of administrative agencies, including the 
FTC. In United States v .  Morton Salt C O . ~ ~  the issue was whether 
the FTC could require corporations to file reports showing their 
compliance with a cease-and-desist order. The Court stated: 
The judicial subpoena power not only is subject to specific con- 
stitutional limitations, which also apply to administrative or- 
ders, such as those against self-incrimination, unreasonable 
search and seizure, and due process of law, but also is subject 
to those limitations inherent in the body that issues them be- 
cause of the provisions of the Judiciary Article of the Constitu- 
t i ~ n . ' ~  
In United States v .  Powell,74 which involved a dispute over 
enforcement of an IRS summons, the Court stated: "It is the 
court's process which is invoked to enforce the administrative 
summons and a court may not permit its process to be abused."75 
Thus, even though the Court upheld the agency action in both 
Morton Salt and Powell, it explicitly recognized that due process 
limits the scope of agency investigative activity. 
Another context in which the due process issue might arise 
is illustrated by the case of Silver v .  M ~ C a r n e y . ~ ~  Silver involved 
the revocation of a license a t  an administrative hearing prior to 
a criminal trial concerning the same charges. On appeal from the 
district court's injunction against the administrative revocation, 
the D.C. Circuit held that "due process is not observed if an 
accused person is subjected, without his consent, to an adminis- 
trative hearing on a serious criminal charge that is pending 
against him."" Due process considerations were also raised in 
United States v .  Parrott, 78 a case involving civil proceedings initi- 
ated by the Securities and Exchange Commission contempora- 
338 U.S. 632 (1950). 
Id. at 642 (emphasis added). 
379 U.S. 48 (1964). 
Id. at 58 (footnote omitted). 
221 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1955). 
Id. at 874-75 (footnote omitted). 
248 F. Supp. 196 (D.D.C. 1965). 
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neously with criminal proceedings initiated by the United States 
Attorney against the same defendant. The criminal court indi- 
cated that thispituation could also arise in the antitrust area and 
stated: "The Court holds that the Government may not bring a 
parallel civil proceeding and avail itself of civil discovery devices 
to obtain evidence for subsequent criminal  prosecution^."^^ 
The prohibition against the use of the civil process to obtain 
information for a criminal prosecution on the same facts is well 
established." The major factor courts cite for the prohibition is 
the essential difference between criminal and civil  proceeding^.^^ 
Judge Bell, in a concurring opinion in Campbell v. Eastland," 
noted that "[tlhe criminal aspect of the matter could not be 
ignored. The end result was tantamount to allowing discovery 
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a criminal proceeding, 
something we are powerless, as was the trial court, to author- 
ize. "83 
The issue of the use of civil proceedings to discover criminal 
violations has arisen most often in the context of Internal Reve- 
nue Service cases. Reisman v. Caplins4 involved a taxpayer's chal- 
lenge to an IRS summons of records held by the taxpayer's ac- 
countant. The Supreme Court in dicta indicated that the sum- 
mons could be challenged on any appropriate grounds, including 
the allegation that the material was being sought for the improper 
purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a criminal prosecution." 
The Court next dealt with the issue of what constitutes an 
improper use of an IRS summons in Donaldson v. United States. 86 
The IRS had issued a summons to Donaldson's former employers 
and his accountant for records relating to Donaldson's compensa- 
tion. The employer refused to comply, and the IRS filed an action 
in district court to enforce the summons. Donaldson intervened, 
alleging that the summons was being used solely to obtain infor- 
79. Id. at 202. 
80. For a discussion of these prohibitions, see Comment, Concurrent Civil and Crimi- 
nal Proceedings, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1967); Note, Stay of Discovery in Civil Court to 
Protect Proceedings in Concurrent Criminal Action-The Pattern of Remedies, 66 MICH. 
L. REV. 738 (1968). 
81. See United States v. Mellon Bank, 545 F.2d 869 (3d Cir. 1976); Campbell v. 
Eastland, 307 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Steffes, 35 F.R.D. 24 (D. Mont. 
1964). 
82. 307 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1962). 
83. 307 F.2d at 492-93 (Bell, J., concurring). 
84. 375 U.S. 440 (1964). 
85. Id. at 449. 
86. 400 U.S. 571 (1971). 
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mation against him for use in a later criminal trial. The Supreme 
Court held that Donaldson had no protectable interest or privi- 
lege that would permit intervention under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 24(a)(2). The Court also held that an IRS summons 
could be used in connection with a criminal investigation if issued 
in good faith and prior to a recommendation for prosecution. The 
Court intimated, however, that use of an IRS summons was not 
permitted if its sole purpose was to gather information for a crimi- 
nal trial 
In the most recent case involving an IRS summons, United 
States v. LaSalle National Bank,ss the Court further described 
the good faith requirement. In LaSalle National Bank an IRS 
special agent issued a summons to the bank to obtain information 
concerning the tax liability of a bank customer. The district court 
refused to enforce the summons since the agent admitted that his 
sole purpose in issuing it was to gain information for a criminal 
prosecution. The disrict court held that such a motivation indi- 
cated bad faith. The appellate court affirmed. 
The Supreme Court reversed, and in so doing made several 
points about IRS powers. First, it noted that Congress had given 
the IRS both civil and criminal enforcement power. Therefore, 
the Court argued, the IRS could use the summons to obtain infor- 
mation prior to the initiation of a criminal prosecution. Once 
criminal proceedings began, however, the Court reasoned that the 
IRS summons could no longer be used to gather information. The 
Court called this a prophylactic rule that helped to protect dis- 
covery in criminal litigation and to preserve the role of the grand 
jury. The Court refused to define the requirement of good faith 
in terms of the IRS agent's motivation in conducting the investi- 
gation. It referred to the various agency procedures that must be 
followed before a prosecution is initiated, and the protection they 
offer to the individual taxpayer against a vendetta by an IRS 
agent. The Court then indicated that the burden of proving that 
an investigation was solely for criminal prosecution was on the 
taxpayer, who must prove the absence of a valid civil tax determi- 
nation or collection purpose in the IRS investigation. Since the 
bank had failed to prove a lack of good faith or the existence of a 
pending criminal proceeding the Court held that the IRS could 
obtain the information from the bank. 
87. Id. at 532-36. 
88. 437 U.S. 298 (1978). 
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These cases attempt to clarify the dual enforcement powers 
of the IRS. A possible analogy might be drawn between the IRS 
in the tax area and the FTC and Justice Department in the anti- 
trust area. However, several arguments can be made against the 
applicability of the tax cases to the antitrust area. Neither 
Donaldson nor LaSalle National Bank indicate whether their 
holdings apply to administrative agencies other than the IRS. 
Another way to distinguish the IRS summons from the FTC sum- 
mons is by reference to the basic differences between the two 
agencies. One of the Court's premises in LaSalle National Bank 
was that Congress has explicitly granted the IRS dual civil and 
criminal enforcement powers.8e It is not inappropriate, therefore, 
for the IRS to use the summons to acquire information to carry 
out these powers. But Congress has not given the FTC dual en- 
forcement powers. Instead, the FTC has only been given civil 
powers to prevent restrictions on trade. Arguably, the use of the 
FTC's sweeping civil powers to obtain information about the anti- 
trust activities of a corporation for later use by the Justice De- 
partment in a criminal proceeding is an abuse of the investigatory 
and prosecutorial powers of the FTC. 
Even if a court allows the FTC to use its civil powers to 
obtain information for criminal prosecutions, the holdings in 
Donaldson, Reisman, and LaSalle National Bank can still be 
used to the advantage of the corporation or its officers under the 
double gaze of the FTC and the Justice Department. For exam- 
ple, if there have been simultaneous investigations of a particular 
company by the Justice Department and the FTC, Donaldson 
and LaSalle National Bank would require the FTC to cease its 
civil discovery as soon as the Justice Department decided to pro- 
secute.".' As the Court indicated in LaSalle National Bank, this 
89. The Court stated: "Congress has created a law enforcement system in which 
criminal and civil elements are inherently intertwined. When an investigation examines 
the possibility of criminal misconduct, it also necessarily inquires about the appropriate- 
ness of assessing the 50% civil tax penalty." Id. a t  309 (footnote omitted). 
89.1. Alternatively, a court could allow the FTC investigation to continue even after 
the Justice Department initiates criminal proceedings but could order the FTC not to 
divulge any information to the Justice Department once the Justice Department decides 
to prosecute. This was the approach taken by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia in a recent case involving shared information between the SEC and 
the Justice Department. SEC v. Dresser Indus. Inc., [I9791 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 7 
97,172, at 96,476 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 19,1979). The court of appeals refused to order the SEC 
to halt its investigation because the relationship between the SEC and the Justice Depart- 
ment was not as close as that between the IRS and the Justice Department and because 
"there is a substantial public interest in swiftly remedying civil securities law violations." 
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somewhat artificial limitation was set up to preserve the role of 
the grand jury and to protect discovery in criminal litigation. 
Arguably, this same limitation would apply in the antitrust area 
where both civil and criminal liabilities exist. 
Even if the decision to prosecute has not been made, the 
FTC's good faith could be challenged under LaSalle National 
Bank, even though the Court there refused to consider an agent's 
motivation as evidence of bad faith. Arguably, the FTC., by using 
its civil powers solely to obtain information for use in a criminal 
proceeding by another agency, is guilty of bad faith. Therefore, 
even though the FTC may not have referred the matter to the 
Justice Department for possible prosecution, a showing of bad 
faith may be grounds for disallowance of any information sharing. 
In summary, there are procedural due process arguments 
that offer hope to the corporation or its officers who attempt to 
prevent information obtained by the FTC during civil discovery 
from being used by the Justice Department in a criminal proceed- 
ing. This would be particularly true if it could be shown that the 
Justice Department had decided to prosecute. If no such recom- 
mendation has been made, then other arguments are available: 
the summons was issued without good faith; the FTC is exceeding 
its congressionally authorized civil powers by obtaining informa- 
tion for a criminal investigation; LaSalle National Bank should 
not be extended to agencies other than the IRS. Arguments such 
as these support the proposition that the use of an administrative 
summons during civil discovery to obtain evidence for use in a 
criminal proceeding should be forbidden. 
C. Self-Incrimination 
Another constitutional basis that courts have relied on to 
enjoin civil proceedings while contemporaneous criminal pro- 
ceedings on the same facts are in progress is the fifth amendment 
proscription of self-in~rimination.~ In United States v. Simon, @l 
however, the Second Circuit rejected fifth amendment challenges 
to the civil discovery process. Simon involved criminal proceed- 
Id. at 96,474-75 (footnote omitted). However, the court held that no information could be 
shared once the Justice Department decided to prosecute because of "the need to main- 
tain the integrity of the criminal discovery process." Id. at 96,476. 
90. See Dienstag v. Bronsen, 49 F.R.D. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Perry v. McGuire, 36 
F.R.D. 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Paul Harrigan & Sons v. Enterprise Animal Oil Co., 14 
F.R.D. 333 (E.D. Pa. 1953). 
91. 373 F.2d 649 (2d Cir.), vacated per curium as moot sub nom. Simon v. Wharton, 
389 U.S. 425 (1967). 
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ings instituted because of alleged violations of the Securities Ex- 
change Act and a civil action brought by the trustee in reorgani- 
zation of a company the criminal defendants were involved with. 
The trustee was seeking the defendants' depositions just prior to 
the criminal proceeding. The judge in the civil case refused to 
enjoin discovery, but the judge in the criminal trial issued an 
order enjoining discovery for ninety days. This order was ap- 
pealed. On appeal the Second Circuit ruled that the defendants 
had failed to specifically allege the need to avail themselves of 
their fifth amendment privileges. According to the court, there 
was also a strong public interest in obtaining the information 
from the defendants. In addition, the defendants could avail 
themselves of the privilege in response to individual questions. 
Moreover, since it was a trustee that was seeking the information 
and not the government, there was less likelihood of prejudice to 
the defendants. 
In SEC v. V e s ~ o , ~ ~  on the other hand, the Federal District 
Court for the Southern District of New York was willing to find 
prejudice against the defendants. This case involved civil pro- 
ceedings brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
against Robert Vesco and others for violation of the Securities 
Exchange Act. The defendants also faced possible criminal prose- 
cution. The defendants alleged that the civil proceedings had 
been purposely initiated before criminal proceedings so that the 
government could take advantage of the liberal civil discovery 
rules. Although the defendants could refuse to testify in the civil 
proceedings, the court reasoned that such a refusal could give rise 
to the inference that the defendants were guilty of the criminal 
charges. If the inference were used in determining guilt, the de- 
fendants would be penalized unjustly for exercising their privi- 
leges against self-incrimination. 
On the other hand, the court argued that the defendants 
could choose to testify, but that such testimony might be used 
against them in a later criminal proceeding. The court reasoned 
that "it is probable that defendants will suffer grave, irreparable 
civil and criminal consequences should they choose either course 
of action, testifying at  the depositions or invoking the protections 
of the Fifth Amendment."p3 The court granted restrictions on 
discovery with respect to certain defendants but indicated that 
92. [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) fi 93,777 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
93. Id. at 93,387. 
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it might be willing to allow discovery if the government granted 
immunity to the defendants." 
The Supreme Court has ruled that the fifth amendment only 
protects individuals, not corporations or  partnership^.^^ Thus the 
corporate official, when claiming his fifth amendment privilege, 
should allege that the information he wishes to withhold stems 
from his own activities and not those of the corporation. If he fails 
to do so, the court can rule that the fifth amendment is not 
applicable. Corporate and partnership records are also not enti- 
tled to the privilege against self-incrimination? However, there 
is a privilege against self-incrimination with respect to the per- 
sonal records of the corporate officer." Therefore, if an attempt 
to withhold records is made, the records must be the officer's, not 
the corporation's. 
D. Inadequate Time to Prepare Defense 
One final argument can be made in an attempt to prevent 
the sharing of information between the Justice Department and 
the FTC. Many times simultaneous prosecutions do not give the 
defendant corporation or its officers sufficient time to adequately 
prepare a criminal defense. In such a case, the proceedings of the 
FTC should be suspended until after completion of the criminal 
prosecution. In United States v. Amrep Corp. this argument was 
advanced and accepted by the federal court in the southern dis- 
trict of New York. The investigation of Amrep began in April 1973 
and the FTC filed a complaint in March 1975. A grand jury inves- 
tigation was begun by the United States Attorney in March 1974 
and an indictment of Amrep and some of its officials returned on 
October 28,1975. Both investigations were based on similar infor- 
mation. Amrep requested a stay of the FTC proceedings, claiming 
that the appearance of corporate officers before the FTC proceed- 
ings would prevent them from adequately preparing for the crimi- 
nal proceedings. The administrative law judge denied the stay, 
and Amrep initiated an action in district court. 
94. Of course, any immunity that would be granted would only be use immunity. See 
18 U.S.C. 99 6001-6002 (1976). The government could still maintain the prosecution later 
? ' if then 
95 < 
(1911). 
96 
(1911). 
97 
98 
were independent sources of information. 
Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 
Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377 (1911). 
405 F. Supp. 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
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The district court rejected the Commission's contention that 
the court did not have jurisdiction. The court held that it was 
proper to intervene to prevent interference with the defendants' 
preparation for trial. The court then dealt with the issue of 
whether the simultaneous actions could interfere with trial prepa- 
ration. The court indicated that it saw no current conflict, but 
believed that there could be problems in the future as the time 
of the criminal trial drew near. The court stayed the FTC's inves- 
tigation until one month after entry of the jury verdict, indicating 
that such a delay was not prejudicial to the FTC. By taking this 
position the court avoided the difficult issue of information shar- 
ing. By advocating the need for a stay in the FTC proceedings, 
the corporation confronted with information sharing, like the 
court in Amrep, may be able to sidestep the sharing issue. 
VI. REMEDIES 
The issue of information sharing can arise in criminal, civil, 
or administrative proceedings. Possible remedies for the corpora- 
tion or its officials must be considered in the context of these 
forums and their various procedures. 
A. Administrative Remedies 
Administrative procedures may be governed by the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure or an agency's own procedural rules. The 
FTC has chosen to adopt its own rules. Separate rules of proce- 
dure govern its adjudicatoryW and nonadjudicatory proceed- 
ings. loo 
In nonadjudicatory proceedings the FTC is generally in- 
volved in investigations of various industries.lol Investigatory ac- 
tions generally have three limitations: they must be authorized 
by Congress, the information sought must be definite, and the 
information sought must be relevant to the inquiry.lo2 Adjudica- 
tory proceedings of the FTC are focused on a particular corpora- 
tion and violations of particular laws.lo3 
99. FTC Rules of Practice for Adjudicative Proceedings, 16 C.F.R. $0  3.1-.72 (1979). 
100. FTC Nonadjudicative Procedures, 16 C.F.R. 0 0 2.1-.34 (1979). 
101. These investigations can be instigated on request of the President, Congress, 
governmental agencies, the attorney general, the courts, or the public. Also, the FTC can 
initiate its own investigations. Id. 0 2.1. 
102. See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946). 
103. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950) (FTC coufd require 
the filing of periodic reports rather than inspection of books and records in order to insure 
that no laws were being violated). 
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In both adjudicatory and nonadjudicatory proceedings the 
principal method of acquiring information from the corporation 
is the administrative subpoena.lO4 If the corporation and its offi- 
cers do not wish to comply with the subpoena, they can file a 
motion to quash.'" At that time they may raise such defenses as 
denial of due process, the prohibition against self-incrimination, 
the irrelevancy of the materials sought, or the burdensomeness of 
the request. 
The FTC, like other federal administrative agencies, has no 
power to enforce its administrative subpoenas.lo6 Instead, it must 
file an action in federal district court. Thus, if the motion to 
quash the administrative subpoena is denied and the corporation 
still refuses to comply, the FTC must go to district court to en- 
force the subpoena. The same contentions can be raised in dis- 
trict court that were raised before the agency. The order of the 
district court, if adverse to the corporation, may then be ap- 
pealed. Even if the final determination is in favor of the agency, 
the agency has no power to punish the corporation for further 
noncompliance. Instead, it must go back to district court to get 
an order of contempt. 
These procedures are time consuming. If the corporation 
fears that the FTC will obtain information in its administrative 
proceedings that may be used against it or its officials in civil or 
criminal proceedings, these cumbersome enforcement procedures 
can work in its favor. It is likely that the civil or criminal proceed- 
ings may be over before the agency succeeds in getting enforce- 
ment of its subpoena.lo7 
The subpoena enforcement process also applies to other as- 
pects of discovery, particularly in adjudicatory proceedings where 
the corporation decides not to comply. The FTC recently enacted 
new rules to govern these proceedings.lo8 In the comments pre- 
ceeding the new rules, the FTC indicated its attempt to give the 
administrative law judge greater control over adjudicatory pro- 
104. Administrative subpoenas in adjudicatory proceedings are governed by 16 
C.F.R. 8 3.34 (1979). Administrative subpoenas in nonadjudicatory proceedings are gov- 
erned by 16 C.F.R. 8 2.7 (1979). 
105. 16 C.F.R. 8 3.34(b)(l) (1979) (adjudicatory proceedings); id. 8 2.11(c) (nonadju- 
dicatory proceedings). 
106. For a discussion of this issue, see Benton, Administrative Subpoena 
Enforcement, 41 TEX. L. REV. 874 (1963). 
107. For a case that illustrates the complexity and time-consuming nature of these 
proceedings, see Penfield Co. v. SEC, 157 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1946), aff'd, 330 U.S. 585 
(1947). 
108. See 43 Fed. Reg. 56,862 (1978) (codified 16 C.F.R. $9 3.1-.72). 
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ceedings.lo9 It also indicated that the new regulations are similar 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The comments also state, 
however, that "judicial constructions of such analogous provi- 
sions may serve as interpretative aides, but they are not to be 
regarded as binding because application of the Commission's 
rules must be tailored to the circumstances of the Commission's 
pro~eedings."~~~ Despite the Commission's warnings, it may be 
helpful to examine judicial decisions in civil actions for further 
arguments that corporate defendants might make in administra- 
tive proceedings. 
B. Civil Remedies 
What can a corporation do in a civil case when no one in the 
corporation can answer interrogatories without the risk of self- 
incrimination with respect to a concurrent criminal proceeding? 
The Supreme Court answered this question in United States v. 
Kordel."' "In such a case the appropriate remedy would be a 
protective order under Rule 30(b), postponing civil discovery 
until termination of the criminal action."l12 
Rule 30(b) is now Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Under Rule 26 a protective order can be obtained to 
protect a party from "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or 
undue burden and expense."l13 If any of these circumstances 
exist, the district court judge may prohibit or limit discovery. A 
corporation involved in concurrent civil and criminal proceedings 
on the same matter could argue that a protective order should be 
imposed in order to prevent the liberal civil discovery provisions 
from being used for criminal discovery. Possible arguments for 
the protective order could be based on the prohibition against 
self-incrimination as suggested in Kordel, on due process consid- 
erations,l14 or on bad faith. 
Since a decision on a stay order is not a final order, it is not 
clear whether it  would be appealable.lI5 Under the Supreme 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 56,863. 
111. 397 U.S. 1 (1970). 
112. Id. at 9 (footnote omitted). 
113. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
114. For decisions on these grounds, see Dienstag v. Bronsen, 49 F.R.D. 327 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Paul Harrigan & Sons v. Enterprise Animal Oil Co., 14 F.R.D. 333 (E.D. 
Pa. 1953). 
115. For decisions holding that the district judge's decision regarding discovery was 
not appealable, see Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Jernigan, 222 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1955) 
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Court's decision in Brown Shoe Co. u. United States, 116 however, 
it could be argued that the district court judge's decision should 
be appealable because it has the appearance of finality and delay 
may foreclose the possibility of later review. The issue of appeala- 
bility in such cases has not been considered by some courts,l17 but 
where it has been considered, the appellate court has sustained 
its power to hear the appealY8 
Based on the comments preceding the new rules governing 
adjudicatory proceedings before the FTC, similar arguments 
could be made before the administrative law judge to stay FTC 
proceedings until completion of a criminal trial. The administra- 
tive law judge's decision would be discretionary.lIB 
C. Criminal Remedies 
The remedies available to a corporation or its officials in a 
criminal proceeding in order to stay a concurrent administrative 
or civil proceeding are much more limited. The Federal, Rules of 
Criminal Procedure indicate that the purpose of the Rules is "to 
provide for just determination of every criminal proceeding."lM 
This policy can form the basis for a defendant's motion to stay 
simultaneous administrative or civil proceedings. 
The defendants in United States v. Simod2l found them- 
selves in just such a situation. The criminal charges included 
conspiracy to commit mail fraud and violations of the Securities 
Exchange Act. Civil actions, one of which involved the same 
transaction, were pending in another district court. The civil ac- 
tions, however, were brought by a trustee in bankruptcy and not 
by the government. After the judge in the civil trial denied a 
(no appeal of order suppressing the taking of depositions); Dille v. Carter Oil Co., 174 F.2d 
318 (10th Cir. 1949) (order requiring deposition to be given is not a final order and 
therefore is not appealable). 
116. 370 U.S. 294, 308-09 (1962). 
117. See United States v. Simon, 373 F.2d 649 (2d Cir.), vacated per curiam as moot 
sub nun. Simon v. Wharton, 389 US.  425 (1967); Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478 
(5th Cir. 1962). 
118. See McSurely v. McClellan, 426 F.2d 664, 667-68 (D.C. Cir. 1970). For another 
decision indicating the appealability of such decisions of the trial judge prior to trial, see 
United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 388 F.2d 201 (3rd Cir. 
1967), cert. denied, 390 US .  922 (1968). 
119. The administrative law judge's decision may be appealed to the full Commission 
if there is a controlling question of fact or law and the appeal would enhance the ultimate 
outcome or subsequent review would be an inadequate remedy. 16 C.F.R. § 3.23(b) (1979). 
120. FED. R. CRIM. P. 2. 
121. 262 F. Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), reu'd, 373 F.2d 649 (2d Cir.), vacated per 
curiam as moot sub nom. Simon v. Wharton, 389 US.  425 (1967). 
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protective order to one defendant, the judge in the criminal trial 
was asked to issue a temporary restraining order to prevent depo- 
sitions from being taken from the criminal defendants. The crimi- 
nal court judge indicated that the need to preserve fairness in 
criminal proceedings underpinned the court's power to issue such 
an order. The court presented two bases for this power: one was 
the All Writs Act; the other was the power of the federal criminal 
court to grant injunctive relief to preserve the fairness of its pro- 
ceedings through its supervisory powers. The defendants had no 
intention of using their fifth amendment privileges during the 
deposition because of their positions in the community. They 
only wished, according to the court, "to have all the relevant facts 
and circumstances completely brought out in the course of their 
defense a t  the proper time, but that they should not be compelled 
to do so before trial."ln The judge indicated that there was a 
substantial likelihood that the prosecutor would ascertain the 
defendants' defense from the depositions before trial.l13 
The court found tha t  the defendants would suffer 
"substantial and irreparable prejudice" if the depositions were 
permitted.'" At the same time, the court indicated that the civil 
proceedings would not be prejudiced by this delay. The court 
then issued an injunction for ninety days to prevent the taking 
of depositions from the defendants. 
The decision in Simon was appealed.lZ5 The court of appeals 
reversed, finding that the defendants had failed to make a show- 
ing that the taking of the depositions would interfere with the 
criminal trial. The court of appeals intimated, however, that a 
court in a criminal trial may have the power to issue an injunction 
if a sufficient showing of harm is made. The court believed that 
the refusal of the injunction did not infringe the defendants' con- 
stitutional rights since they could avail themselves of their fifth 
amendment privileges as to individual questions. The defen- 
dants' reasons for not invoking the privilege were rejected. An- 
other source of concern to the court was the possible conflict that 
could arise between courts because of such orders. The decision 
was appealed to the Supreme Court and certiorari was granted, 
but the case was later vacated as moot.126 
122. Id. at 72. 
123. Id. at 72-73. 
124. Id. at 77. 
125. United States v. Simon, 373 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1967). 
126. Simon v. Wharton, 389 U.S. 425 (1967). 
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The applicability of Simon to other situations is not clear. A 
defendant involved in simultaneous criminal and civil or admin- 
istrative proceedings could ask the court in the criminal proceed- 
ings to enjoin the civil or administrative proceedings based on the 
criminal courts supervisory powers or the All Writs Act. Given the 
court of appeals' decision in Simon, however, a strong showing of 
harm to the defendant would need to be made. 
For a corporation and its officials involved in simultaneous 
civil and criminal proceedings within the same federal district, an 
additional problem may present itself. In United States v. Ameri- 
can Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.ln the defendants were 
involved in simultaneous civil and criminal antitrust proceedings 
within the same federal judicial district. The defendants moved 
for a stay of the civil proceedings, which was denied by the judge 
presiding over the civil proceedings. The defendants then re- 
quested the judge presiding over the criminal proceedings to stay 
the civil proceedings. The judge granted the stay, but was re- 
versed on appeal. The appellate court inidicated that it was im- 
proper for one court within the same federal district to reverse 
another court. According to the appellate court, the defendant 
should have appealed the decision in the civil action via a 
preemptory writ-it was not proper to attempt to overrule the 
decision of tlie judge in the civil proceedings by later requesting 
the judge in the criminal trial for a stay of the civil proceedings. 
The rationale for this decision included avoiding the appearance 
of conflict within the district and saving judicial time and ex- 
pense. The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, but 
certiorari was denied? Other courts have generally followed this 
opinion. 12@ 
Federal agencies are continually receiving more power from 
Congress to regulate various corporate activities. Increased power 
necessarily countenances the possibility of increased abuses of 
that power. The FTC abuses its powers when it utilizes its ex- 
tremely liberal discovery powers to obtain information for use in 
concurrent or contemplated criminal proceedings-criminal pro- 
127. 388 F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 922 (1968). 
128. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v. United States, 390 U.S. 922 
(1968). 
129. See, e.g., Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v. Swope, 326 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Fla. 
1971), aff'd, 455 F.2d 638 (5th Cir. 1972). 
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ceedings that have traditionally given only limited discovery 
power to the government. Such a practice raises serious ethical 
questions. 
The Code of Professional Responsibility indicates that "a 
government lawyer in a civil action or administrative proceeding 
has the responsibility to seek justice and to develop a full and fair 
record, and he should not use his position or the economic power 
of the government to harass parties or to bring unjust settlements 
or results."lJO A sharing of information between the FTC and the 
Justice Department could violate this ethical consideration if it 
is unfair or brings unjust results. In determining what is unjust 
or unfair, an important issue arises: who is the client the govern- 
ment attorney serves? 
Judge Charles Fahy, in a speech before the Columbia Univer- 
sity School of Law, indicated: "Our government is one of the very 
greatest institutions ever to come into being, and to grow and live. 
But is it truly the servant of the human beings who are the coun- 
try. . . . The rights of the citizens must be assiduously pro- 
tected, and also the rights of the general community."131 In an 
opinion by the Professional Ethics Committee of the Federal Bar 
Association the government lawyer was described as follows: 
This lawyer assumes a public trust for the government, overall 
and in each of its parts, is responsible to the people in our 
democracy with its representative form of government. Each 
part of the government has the obligation of carrying out, in the 
public interest, its assigned responsibility in a manner consis- 
tent with the Constitution, and the applicable laws and regula- 
tions. 132 
If the public is the ultimate client of any federal agency, the 
question of whether it is appropriate to use civil or administrative 
proceedings to obtain information for use against a corporation 
and its officers in a criminal proceeding should be answered by 
ascertaining whether the public, qua client, would endorse such 
an activity. The government attorney's conduct should set an 
example to the public-hig client-of the highest ethical stan- 
dards. Abuse of the civil process to obtain information for another 
prosecution is unfair, unjust, and unethical. Another reason why 
130. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONS~IISTY, Canon 7, EC 7-14. 
131. Fahy, Special Ethical Problems of Counsel for the Government, 33 FED. B.J. 331, 
339 (1974). 
132. Professional Ethics Committee, Federal Bar Association, The Government 
Client and Confidentiality: Opinion 73-1, 32 FED. B.J. 71, 72 (1973). 
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such behavior should not be sanctioned by a court is that it is not 
needed by the government for successful prosecutions. The gov- 
ernment has ample power to secure information without resort to 
unfair or unjust means. As the Supreme Court indicated with 
respect to the prosecuting counsel: "[Wlhile he may strike hard 
blows, he is not a t  liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty 
to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrong- 
ful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about - 
a just one."ls3 Permitting a government attorney to abuse process 
to gather information may be an "improper method." Thus the 
validity of the arguments against governmental information shar- 
ing, such as self-incrimination, violation of agency function, and 
due process, while legally important, are as a matter of social 
policy irrelevant. The ultimate issue is an ethical one: how do the 
American people wish to have their laws enforced? 
133. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
